[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]When Joseph Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac it was in bad shape. 1862 had led to several costly battles that whittled the army away. Poor supply situations were leading to malnutrition and cases of scurvy were being reported. Morale was at an all-time low and soldiers were deserting in droves. Changes were needed and Hooker dove in head first. Amnesty was offered to deserters with the only punishment being a loss of pay for the time they were away. Food rations were improved as were sanitary conditions in camp and a training regimen was embarked upon. Weak officers were weeded out. Furloughs were offered as well to enlisted men. To foster unit pride each corps was encouraged to adopt a symbol for itself. The effect was nearly instantaneous and positive.
Hooker’s generals were also shaken up. With Burnside went his IX Corps to other assignments. Edwin Sumner resigned due to poor health (and would actually be dead within a few weeks) and William Franklin resigned since he refused to serve under Hooker. Hooker did away with the Grand Divisions and also created a cavalry corps so it could operate under a single head rather than dispersing it through each corps. Not all moves were positive. While retaining Henry Hunt as chief of artillery he stripped his talented artillery chief of any combat authority.
For Lee his situation was little changed but as always supplies were scarce. James Longstreet’s Corps was sent to Suffolk to gather supplies and to try to kick Union troops out of the area. Two of his divisions would go with him and thus would not be available to Lee. Also due to the lack of provisions Lee had his cavalry move away to find better pastures for the horses. His command was scattered and would not be able to concentrate quickly if attacked.
Hooker also brought improvement to one other area of the army: intelligence. No more Pinkerton Detectives or civilian balloon observers. Now the Bureau of Military Intelligence would handle all of that. They would handle the interrogation of prisoners and runaway slaves and would control cavalry reconnaissance. The balloon corps would remain but would be under military authority and signal stations were installed to transmit coded information quickly. Hooker knew he needed to avoid frontal assaults which meant he had to maneuver and to do so he needed accurate information. In this regard he did quite well.[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]Hooker’s plan was bold. His new cavalry corps would sweep to the west and raid Confederate towns and supply depots and create havoc while cutting Lee’s communications and forcing him to abandon his position along the Rappahannock River and fall back to Richmond. While this was going on the infantry would cross the river and pursue. The first attempt was made on April 13 but heavy rains forced it to be aborted.
Hooker came up with a new plan. The cavalry’s mission would be the same but Hooker would now divide his infantry and hit Lee from different directions. Three corps (III, V and XI) would cross the river at Kelly’s Ford, cross the Rapidan River and concentrate at Chancellorsville in the Virginia Wilderness. They would be joined by 2 divisions of the II Corps who would cross at US Ford (the other division would remain behind as a ruse along with the III Corps since they were visible to Confederate eyes). The I and VI Corps would cross at Fredericksburg and attack Stonewall Jackson. Lee would be outmaneuvered and would have to retreat Hooker believed. Chancellorsville was a brick mansion at the junction of the Orange Plank Road and the Orange Turnpike and not an actual town.
Hooker had 133,000 men at his command, Lee 65,000. With 13,000 men away from Lee with Longstreet Hooker could not have asked for a more favorable situation when the march began on April 27 amidst fine spring weather. Since Hooker knew that the Confederates had broken the old signal code he used that to his advantage to spread misinformation to keep his enemies guessing. For the first few days everything went according to plan and by May 1 he had 70,000 men at Chancellorsville with more on the way.
Lee was in the dark. His cavalry commander, JEB Stuart had been cut off by Union cavalry but began conducting intelligence as soon as they moved on. Despite being in the dark Lee did not pull back when he learned that Hooker was on the move. He was convinced that the force at Fredericksburg was nothing more than a diversion and moved Jackson away from there to link up with the 2 divisions from Longstreet’s Corps that were still with Lee. 11,000 men were left in Fredericksburg to defend it and fog prevented the Union troops there from acting more aggressively.[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]Leading the Union advance in the Wilderness were the US Regulars under George Sykes. Around 11:20 on May 1 Sykes’ men ran into Lafayette McLaws’ Division near the Mullins Farm along the Plank Road. A stalemate resulted and Sykes believed that he was exposed and withdrew around 2 PM. More Union troops were coming though and soon Hooker had overwhelming numbers but he halted the movement. Hooker wanted to fight a defensive battle and he wanted to draw Lee into attacking him. By 5 PM the Union army was falling back into the Wilderness. Hooker’s order came as a surprise to his generals who were furious but orders were orders and the Union troops began digging in.
Lee would be only too happy to take the initiative and attack. He met with Jackson and by a large fire and hashed out their plans. Stuart arrived with information that Hooker’s right flank was in the air and vulnerable so Jackson was sent to assault that flank. His cartographer learned of a road that was not on the maps and if it was not on their maps it would not be on Hooker’s map either. Jackson would take his entire corps with him to make this movement. This left Lee to stare down Hooker with only two divisions, a dangerous prospect indeed if Hooker decided to change his mind and resume the offensive.
John Reynolds’ I Corps had never engaged in Fredericksburg outside of crossing the river and it was on its way to Chancellorsville. The XI Corps under Oliver Howard was on the right and in the air but when the I Corps arrived it would extend the line to the river and secure it. The I Corps was expected to arrive in the morning of May 2 but it was still on the march.[/vc_column_text][vc_media_grid item=”mediaGrid_BlurWithContentBlock” grid_id=”vc_gid:1514645744573-2047f525-3b6d-0″ include=”6024,6025,6026″][vc_column_text]Jackson began moving his 28,000 men around Hooker’s flank at dawn. Success depended on making the 12 mile march undetected. Hooker’s balloon observers were spotted but for whatever reason they did not spot Jackson’s men. Union infantry at a clearing called Hazel Grove also saw Jackson’s movement and reported it while watching the entire column pass and they occasionally harassed it. Hooker thought Jackson was retreating but could not rule out a flank march so he alerted Howard and told him to dig in and advance his pickets before 11 AM. Hooker also ordered John Sedgewick to attack at Fredericksburg with his VI Corps and for Dan Sickels to attack with his III Corps. Sickels advanced but by then Jackson was gone except for a regiment of Georgians who were captured. Sedgewick did nothing.
When Jackson arrived on the Union flank he scouted along with Lee’s nephew Fitzhugh. They found Howard’s men resting around 3 PM preparing dinner. Howard had ignored Hooker’s warning to dig in and he had not protected his flank or even deployed skirmishers. Jackson finished his march and prepared to strike. He would attack with two lines, the divisions of Robert Rodes and Raleigh Colston in the front and A.P. Hill in the rear.
Howard’s men were old foes of Jackson having fought him the Valley in 1862 under Franz Sigel. At Second Bull Run they had bore the brunt assaulting Jackson and had taken heavy losses. Many of the soldiers (though not all) were German immigrants and for them Sigel was popular. They did not like the Bible-thumping Howard and he did not like them. While many of the immigrants had combat experience in Europe they did not flourish in the American army and they were resented by the American soldiers. Hooker had placed this corps here to keep them away from the main battle.
Jackson struck at 5:30 PM. The first sign of the attack came not from pickets but from forest animals being driven by Jackson toward Howard. Then the Rebel Yell. The first division in line crumbled immediately. The next division moved to defend itself quickly but was overlapped and also overwhelmed. Howard tried to rally his men but most ran and did not stop for a mile. Howard’s men fought in small pockets and fought hard taking heavy losses. Howard lost 1/4 of his corps during this attack Union and it rampaged until artillery at the Chancellor House brought Rodes’ attack to a stop at 7:15 PM. Union reinforcements from Sickles blocked the attackers path as the sun went down but only Sickles men stood between Lee and Jackson. In this exposed position his men drew a large amount of friendly fire.[/vc_column_text][vc_media_grid element_width=”2″ item=”mediaGrid_BlurWithContentBlock” grid_id=”vc_gid:1514645744581-284caf56-4524-4″ include=”6028,6029,6030,6031,6032″][vc_column_text]Jackson wanted to continue the attack despite the darkness so he went out to make a reconnaissance. He was warned not to go but did anyway. On the way back a nervous sentry challenged him believing that Union cavalry was trying to attack and Jackson was shot three times. He was carried from the field and his left arm was amputated at Ellwood, the home of a relative of Jackson’s personal chaplain.[/vc_column_text][vc_media_grid element_width=”2″ item=”mediaGrid_BlurWithContentBlock” grid_id=”vc_gid:1514645744584-8acf156b-5861-10″ include=”6048,6047,6046,7118,7119″][vc_column_text]Jackson’s attack was a success but it had really only knocked one Union corps out of the battle. The I Corps arrived and made up for Howard’s losses. Sickles still was between Lee and Jackson and would have to be dealt with first when the sun came up but Hooker made another blunder and ordered Nickels to pull back from Hazel Grove. As soon as he did Confederate troops moved in a seized the position and soon the Confederates would have 30 guns positioned here. Sickles would rue this day two months later in Pennsylvania.
Replacing Jackson on May 3 was A.P. Hill, who was soon wounded himself and Hill sent for Stuart to take command. Confederate attacks began at 5:30 AM but gained little headway. The Union troops fought behind earthworks and resisted fiercely. The Union line was like a horseshoe but with a bulge in the center and if Lee could cave that bulge in he could win the battle. Artillery dueled between Hazel Grove and the new and less formidable Union position at Fairview and the Union artillery was forced to withdraw. Hooker now was fighting a battle to retreat before Lee could unite his army.
During the fighting in the morning of May 3 a cannonball a column of the Chancellor House that Hooker was leaning on. He was stunned, modern analysis suggests that he was concussed. He was unconscious for an hour and when he awoke he refused to hand over command to Darius Couch. No one could convince him to hand over command and the army’s medical director refused to relieve him. Hooker ordered his men to fall back and he surrendered Chancellorsville to Lee. Couch wanted to take the offensive and did not want to retreat. What could have happened?[/vc_column_text][vc_media_grid element_width=”2″ item=”mediaGrid_BlurWithContentBlock” grid_id=”vc_gid:1514645744588-4cea266e-b4cf-0″ include=”6033,6045,6034,6039,6040,6035,6036,6044,6038,6043,6042,6041,6037″][vc_column_text]On May 3 Sedgewick in Fredericksburg finally decided to attack. The Confederate commander there, Jubal Early, had detached some of his men back to help Lee so his force was weakened. Sedgewick advanced over the ground fought over in the previous winter and drove Early from Marye’s Heights after three tries. Sedgewick then began moving toward Chancellorsville. At Salem Church he again fought Early and after a heavy fight he found he could not break Early’s line. So ended May 3, the second bloodiest day of the war with 21,300 combined casualties.
Hooker fell back to a more compact line on May 3 and remained in that position on the 4th. Since Hooker was on the run Lee reinforced Early to attack Sedgewick. These men got in between Sedgewick and Fredericksburg but found Sedgewick in a strong position. Despite Lee himself arriving the Confederates remained passive until about 6 PM when Lee attacked. One flank was driven back but no real damage was done but Sedgewick, who was getting no guidance from Hooker chose to retreat and was back across the Rappahannock via Bank Ford by the pre-dawn hours of May 5.
Hooker called for a council of war on May 5. His corps commanders wanted to stay and fight. Hooker wanted to retreat and could not be convinced otherwise. By 6 AM the army was in retreat. Darius Couch, Hooker’s second-in-command was left in charge with orders not to continue the battle but he did consider it. Lee was planning on continuing the battle and was preparing to make an assault when he learned that Hooker was gone.[/vc_column_text][vc_media_grid element_width=”2″ item=”mediaGrid_BlurWithContentBlock” grid_id=”vc_gid:1514645744591-76b25f07-1a94-9″ include=”6021,6022,6023″][vc_column_text]And what of the cavalry that Hooker had sent out? They destroyed a few bridges but failed to accomplish what Hooker had wanted. They withdrew into Union lines on May 7. Their commander, George Stoneman, would be relieved of command soon.
Casualties were high, in fact this was the bloodiest battle of the war to date. Lee lost 13,000 men, including Jackson who died of pneumonia on May 10 at Guinea Station. Hooker lost about 17,200 men. The North was stunned. They had once again been confident of victory and through mismanagement and incompetence had lost it. Hooker would not be replaced though some generals did lose their jobs and enemies were created between Hooker, Howard and Henry Slocum (XII Corps commander). For the South there was muted joy. Another great victory but with an irreplaceable loss in Jackson.
Much of the battlefield is preserved as a part of Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park with part of the first day’s battlefield preserved by the Civil War Trust.[/vc_column_text][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_btn title=”Back to the Civil War” style=”3d” align=”center” button_block=”true” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Ftheworldneedsmorekevin.com%2Fbattlefields%2Fcivil-war%2F|||”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_btn title=”Back to Stone’s River (Murfreesboro)” style=”3d” align=”center” button_block=”true” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Ftheworldneedsmorekevin.com%2Fbattlefields%2Fcivil-war%2Fstones-river%2F|||”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_btn title=”Next to Brandy Station” style=”3d” align=”center” button_block=”true” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Ftheworldneedsmorekevin.com%2Fbattlefields%2Fcivil-war%2Fbrandy-station%2F|||”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row]